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For the second time within a decade the National Health Service has 
been reorganised and a third restructuring, albeit of a more limited nature, 
is in the offing. Events in Scotland have lagged behind those elsewhere in 
the UK, have followed a different course and have resulted in slightly 
different outcomes. The intention in this chapter is not to describe in great 
detail the nuts and bolts of the arrangements that have taken root. Some of 
this detail and the problems confronting the fifteen Scottish Health Boards 
in implementing the reforms are presented in another chapter. This chapter 
attempts to trace the origins of the latest reforms, describes their 
underlying philosophy and pinpoints where they differ from the rest of the 
UK. In so doing, the narrative provides a commentary on aspects of health 
policy-making in Scotland which is conducted in a wider UK arena where 
the central department in London, the DHSS, takes the lead. 
The developments reviewed here focus on two separate, though 
related, reform initiatives. The first is directed towards the actual 
organisational structure of the Health Service; the second is concerned in 
large part with the managerial culture and the processes encased by these 
structures. Each is considered in tum and a third section assesses their 
significance for future health policy and for health care in Scotland. 
Structural Reform 
Between 1974 and 1984 the structure of the Scottish Health Service 
comprised three levels below the central department, as shown in the 
Diagram. From mid-1984 the structure comprised two levels below the 
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central department. Ten of the fifteen health boards, i.e. the multi-district 
areas, were affected by the changes. While the actual changes are of some 
interest, much more interesting is the rationale underlying them and the 
process of their adoption which makes for a curious saga of hesitancy, lack 
of direction and policy reversal. If, as has been alleged,<1l policy-making is 
as much about puzzlement as power then the 1984 reorganisation of the 
Scottish Health Service bears ample testimony to the salience of this view. 
To understand events in Scotland over the past four years it is 
necessary to say something about those in England. As will become clear 
what happened in Scotland was a direct result of what happened in 
England; the same holds for Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Not long after the NHS was initially reorganised in 1974 rumblings 
were heard from various quarters about the disaster it was proving to be. It 
was alleged, mainly by sections of the medical profession, that Sir Keith 
Joseph, then Secretary of State for Social Services, had created a 
bureaucratic Leviathan that was in danger of collapsing under its own 
weight. Criticism centred on the number of management tiers ('shed a tier' 
became a well-worn cliche in Health Service circles in the latter half of the 
1970s), on the inflated number of administrative staff (i.e. the dog was 
getting smaller while his tail was growing bushier), on the remoteness of 
appointed bodies from the communities they served, and, by no means 
least, on the system of consensus management whereby decisions lay in the 
hands of teams of officers from the four main disciplines: administration, 
finance, medicine and nursing. There are those who maintain that the only 
way to manage a complex undertaking like the NHS is through multi-
disciplinary consensus teams;<2l others, who were vocal in the late 1970s, 
argue that consensus management is a negation of good management and 
that its introduction into the NHS in 1974 was the outcome of an 'implicit 
bargain •(J) between the government and a suspicious medical profession 
jealously guarding its interests which it believed would be threatened by 
any form of chief executive system of management. Moreover, those 
belonging to this school of thought argue that the very nature of the NHS 
(chiefly its complexity and its multi-professional composition) which has 
led to great opposition to chief executives also happens to be the very 
reason why they are required. <4l This debate is returned to later in the 
chapter. 
It is hard to know whether the discontent over reorganisation was 
merely the frustration with their lot felt by some displaced groups who 
yearned for the cosy familiarity of a structure many had known for twenty 
years or more. There is no doubt that the 197 4 reforms opened up decision-
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making to other groups. The duopoly, or cosy cabal, of administrators and 
doctors gave way to a management team concept involving other 
disciplines. Moreover, the purpose of the 1974 reforms was to replace the 
former tripartite structure comprising local authority health services, 
primary care and hospital services with a more unified structure to enable 
integrated care to be provided to people whose needs transgressed 
professional and organisational boundaries. It should also be stressed that 
while the reorganised NHS was not enthused over by everyone in Scotland 
there was far less overt hostility towards it than was the case in England. In 
part this may have been because it was simpler but other reasons were 
probably important, too, including a healthier resource base in Scotland 
compared with England and a scale of activities generally which was 
claimed to be more manageable and which could be conducted more 
informally. 
In England the rumblings became sufficiently loud for a Royal 
Commission to be set up in 1976 only two years after the NHS had been 
reorganised. The Commission's remit was to look at the management of the 
NHS, a Herculean task which was handled competently if not with aplomb. 
It reported in 1979<5> by which time the Labour Government had been 
replaced by a Conservative administration. While in Opposition, the 
Conservatives had begun to form very clear ideas about what they saw as 
being wrong with the NHS and what they saw as the cure. Whereas the 
Royal Commission advocated a gradualist, evolutionary approach to 
reforming aspects of the structure in certain health authorities, the 
government sought a more dramatic remedy that would involve the entire 
NHS. Their thoughts on the matter were set out in a consultative 
document, Patients First, published in late 1979. <6l It payed homage to the 
Royal Commission's recommendations but in general ignored most of what 
the Commission had to say. Clearly Ministers had already made up their 
minds and the Commission's report was only invoked where it bolstered 
their ideas. 
Hard on the heels of the English consultative document came versions 
for the rest of the UK. In contrast to the English paper, the Scottish one(?l 
was very thin - seven pages of text compared with twenty-five pages- and 
gave the appearance of being a 'knee-jerk' response to the English 
document. Whereas the English paper produced a firm rationale for the 
proposed reforms based on notions of Jaissez-faire, devolution and 
flexibility with a strong desire to loosen the centre's reins on the periphery, 
the Scottish paper lacked this dimension. It did not even have a thematic 
title. What was proposed for the NHS across the UK was a simplification of 
the structure: superficially, only the details and the titles differed in the four 
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parts of the UK. In Scotland it was proposed to retain the fifteen health 
boards but in the ten boards with district structures it was suggested that 
many, if not all, of them should abolish these and establish units of 
management. 
In England the changes proposed were more substantial: the area tier 
of management below region was to be shed and a new district authority 
level created below it which would more or less correspond to the then 
existing district management teams,. The new districts, however, were to 
be not merely management bodies but were to be member bodies 
responsible for policy-making and planning activities. Details of the 
arrangements below districts were to be issued at a later stage although 
three general principles were outlined: (a) maximum delegation of 
responsibility to hospital and community services; (b) no managerial tier 
between the hospital and community services level and the district level; 
and (c) hospital staff, other than clinical staff, to be accountable to the 
hospital administrator and not to district level managers (i.e. functional 
management in services like catering, laundries and cleaning was to be 
curtailed somewhat to reduce fragmentation). 
The Scottish consultative paper was a curious document. Although 
reference was made to the Royal Commission, the opening paragraph 
made it clear that the Scottish Secretary of State's statement was triggered 
by the Secretary of State for Social Services' action in producing Patients 
First. More curious still was the strategy favoured for restructuring. If 
Jaissez-faire was the name of the game it reached extremes in Scotland 
where the ten health boards with districts (see Appendix for details of 
these) were asked to review their arrangements 'with a view to abolishing 
districts'. It was accepted that in a handful of cases boards would wish to 
retain districts and it was a matter of these boards stating their retaining 
reasons for the status quo. 
In Scotland an option would have been to remove the area health 
boards, which, strictly speaking, are comparable to the area health 
authorities in England which were abolished in 1982, and centre operations 
on districts or on new authorities to be of a size somewhere between areas 
and districts. However because abolition of health boards would have 
entailed a considerable upheaval and because the areas had, in the 
government's view, worked well since 1974 it was decided to leave boards 
intact. In other respects the document kept close to its English counterpart 
from which it took its cue. 
Within the NHS there was no real enthusiasm for a second 
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reorganisation in under a decade and, despite repeated assurances from 
Ministers, the upheaval that ensued was inevitably greater than had been 
predicted. Progress was swifter in England where a timetable was laid down 
and the new district health authorities assumed their responsibilities on 1 
April 1982. In Scotland events proved to be more protracted than 
elsewhere in the UK and the main changes have only fairly recently been 
completed in some boards. A firm timetable was not set for Scotland at the 
start. 
In England a circular<8> appeared in July 1980 setting out the 
government's decisions about restructuring. Area health authorities and 
health districts were to be replaced by district health authorities. Below 
districts, services were to be organised into units of management 
comprising an administrator, a nurse and a senior member of the medical 
staff. Units could be organised in a number of ways: a large single hospital, 
the community services of a district, client care services, maternity services, 
geographical areas, or a group of hospitals. It was up to the new districts to 
produce plans for units which would then be approved by the regions. 
In Scotland a circular appeared almost a year later in March 1981.(9) 
This followed two statements in Parliament by the Secretary of State on 
progress in Scotland. The first ofthese, in July 1980, referred to the division 
of opinion among health boards over the fate of districts. Three out of the 
ten boards with districts favoured their abolition and were later joined by 
another two. The other seven, the so-called 'Magnificent Seven' (later 
reduced to five), opted to retain a district structure. The second statement, 
in March 1981, had nothing new to say beyond the fact that discussions 
between the Department and health boards were in progress. Decoding the 
language, this meant that the discussions had run into difficulties and 
progress had ceased. 
The circular itself reaffirmed the Secretary of State's desire to see 
districts abolished or, if this was not possible, their number reduced. In 
other respects, in particular the emphasis on strong unit management, the 
circular followed the English one. 
The impatience with some health boards and the future of their 
districts which could just be detected in the Scottish circular came to a head 
in November 1983 when the Secretary of State announced to Parliament in 
response to a question<10> that all health boards were to operate without 
districts and were to be so instructed forthwith. Significantly, and 
somewhat curiously, the decision was taken with the concurrence of health 
board Chairmen including those from the five boards intent upon retaining 
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districts. The extent to which Chairmen gave their agreement willingly or 
with reservations is not clear. The Secretary of State may have enlisted their 
support in order to legitimise the decision in the eyes of those managing 
services and to avoid, or minimise, a hostile reaction to the abolition of 
districts. In short, the room for manoeuvre available to Chairmen might 
have been very limited. 
The Secretary of State alleged that 'adopting a common form of 
organisation will also provide a firm basis for consideration of the 
recommendations of the NHS Management Inquiry led by Griffiths ... ' (see 
below). The circular< 11 l which followed went further, asserting that the 
Secretary of State was 'in no doubt that the elimination of districts ... will 
contribute to the pattern of strong unit management recommended by the 
Griffiths Report'. The circular gave other more immediate reasons for the 
abrupt switch from a laissez-faire to a directive stance. In the period since 
the first circular it had become evident 'that the revised management 
structures being devised by individual health boards would create excessive 
disparities between them, and bring about considerable difficulties for both 
management and staff. (IZ) A key problem was reaching agreement on 
Whitley Council gradings. It seems surprising that these problems had not 
been anticipated, a reflection, perhaps, of the lack of thorough preparation 
in Scotland for the second reorganisation. 
The ten health boards with districts were required to establish units of 
management which would be 'coherent and discrete areas of management 
responsibility, forming a distinct management level to which substantial 
decisions can be devolved'. (!3) A firm date - 1 April 1984 - was set for 
implementation of the reforms by the five health boards which had 
originally planned to abolish districts. An extension of two months was 
given to the other five boards which had hastily to draw up plans for units. 
From June all health boards were to be uniform only varying in the number 
and type of units they decided to establish. 
How are these various moves in the second round of the reorganisation 
game to be interpreted? And what alternative options were available? At 
one level the moves can be seen as evidence of the lack of enthusiasm in the 
SHHD for a further reorganisation, an absence of clear thinking about 
what was wanted and as the consequence of ending up with a structure of 
health boards some of which would have two tiers below them (districts and 
units) while others would have just one tier comprising units some of which 
would resemble in all but name the districts they were replacing. At another 
level the history of events illustrates how difficult it is in practice to allow 
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powerful counterpressures, in the shape of Whitley Councils and 
professional bodies, for consistency and uniformity not only between but 
also within the four countries making up the UK. 
The five health boards which initially decided to retain districts did so 
either on grounds of size (Glasgow and Lothian), geography (Highland), or 
a combination of both (Lanarkshire and Tayside). But with ten boards 
either already without districts or intent upon abolishing them the pressure 
was on the remaining 'recalcitrant' boards to fall into line whatever their 
reasons for retaining districts. Had a number of boards been permitted to 
retain districts then this would have made an already anomalous situation 
even more anomalous. Scottish districts would have resembled English 
districts in name only. Unit administrators below districts would have been 
a quite separate species from their counterparts in other boards or South of 
the Border. Doubtless such factors were in part responsible for the pressure 
exerted upon all boards to remove districts although, as mentioned above, 
this still left Scotland in a different position from that taking shape 
elsewhere. 
There were many administrators who were of the opinion that the 
government had dismissed too readily a review of area health board 
boundaries and functions. The Scottish Division of the Institute of Health 
Service Administrators (IHSA) commented on the proposals in April1980 
and 'doubted the validity ofthe premises on which the proposals to retain 
existing areas and abolish their districts were based'. <14l The IHSA 
described the area boundaries as a compromise beween planning 
requirements and operational management and argued that a case could be 
made for reconsidering the boundaries. 
Whatever the arguments for or against districts, the Scottish Health 
Service as it now stands is in some respects unique in the UK. <15) With the 
abolition of districts there is a preponderance of areas very much larger 
than the average-sized district health authority (DHA) in England. This 
carries with it potential span of control problems particularly in Glasgow 
and Lothian which are the biggest day-to-day health management bodies in 
the UK (see Appendix).<16l Moreover since there is no regional tier in 
Scotland health boards must assume a wider range of responsibilities than 
the English DHAs. Other regional functions are run by the SHHD or by the 
Common Services Agency which is jointly managed by the Department and 
by the health boards (see Diagram). 
One way of removing the anomalies created by choosing to axe 
districts would have been to recast health board boundaries but, as noted 
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earlier, this course was rejected on the grounds that a major upheaval was 
to be avoided. However, in his first Parliamentary statement in 1980, 
referred to above, George Younger, the Secretary of State for Scotland 
maintained, as he had done in the consultative paper, that 'the changes to 
be made in district organisation and management levels below area will 
have substantial implications for staff'. In his second statement in 1981 he 
referred to the five boards without districts 'where the scope for major 
structural change does not exist' thereby clearly suggesting that the 
abolition of districts was more than just an exercise in fine-tuning. For some 
people in the health service this admission effectively demolished the 
argument for not examining health board boundaries which the 
government, in its 1979 consultative paper, had decided was not on the 
agenda for discussion. 
Concern over the size of area health boards arose because of what was 
happening in England at the time. Most of the 194 English DHAs cover 
populations of about 200,000 with large authorities, i.e. 500,000 and over, 
being the exception. In Scotland, Greater Glasgow Health Board covers a 
population of over one million and Lothian a population of three quarter 
million. On the basis of figures produced in Parliament on the size of 
English DHAs, Rees<17l contrasted the position with what was happening in 
Scotland. Only 6% of DHAs have populations over 400,000 compared with 
50% of health boards (excluding the three island boards); 70% of DHAs 
fall within the population band 100,000 to 300,000 compared with only 26% 
of Scottish boards; 75% of the districts in Scotland covered populations of 
between 100,000 and 300,000. On the basis of these figures it was thought 
that the Scottish districts or, in some cases, amalgamations of districts 
should form the basis of new authorities. 
Of course an increase in the number of health boards would probably 
have brought forth calls for a regional tier in order to achieve complete 
parity with England and to return Scotland to a pre-197 4 type of structure 
comprising regional boards and boards of management. Between 1948 and 
1974, the NHS across the UK was more uniform than it became after 1974. 
Apart from the merits or demerits of focussing attention on districts, 
there were two central weaknesses in the government's case for 
reorganising the NHS in Scotland. First, whereas in England savings in 
management costs were a rna jor factor in the desire to simplify the structure 
this was not the case in Scotland. Even if one were sceptical of the claims 
being made in England that management costs might be reduced by up to 
10%, it at least provided a firm political rationale for the upheaval that did 
not depend exclusively on unsubstantiated theoretical organisational gains 
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from shedding a tier. As administrators in Scotland argued, why proceed 
with major reform if no savings were likely to be realised and if the other 
benefits were uncertain to say the least. The effect upon morale and the 
disruption of services could hardly be justified. Even allowing for an 
element of safeguarding jobs, this view cannot be dismissed lightly given 
the inevitable distraction from arguably more important matters that any 
reorganisation brings in its train. 
But the chief cause for dismay in Scotland over restructuring was the 
admission by the then Health and Social Work Minister, Sir Russell 
Fairgrieve, that 'with England having to do it we felt on balance we should 
do it'.< 18l Sir Russell went on record saying that 'while we don't like in 
Scotland necessarily to trail in England's coat tails the fact is that England 
was having a look at the thing after six years. It was really felt on balance 
that we ought to look at the structure in Scotland as well because we were 
quite convinced there could be some improvement'. The Minister 
hypothesised that if Scotland enjoyed independence he would probably not 
have gone ahead with reorganisation. 
The above account of events in Scotland between 1979 and the present 
time is an endorsement of Keating and Midwinter's< 19l argument about 
policy-making generally in Scotland that 'if an issue comes up through the 
UK network or arises simultaneously in England and Scotland, (the 
Secretary of State's) discretion will be more limited'. The role of the 
Scottish Office becomes largely reactive responding to initiatives from the 
'lead' department (DHSS) in London rather than grasping initiatives itself. 
Creativity in the Scottish Office seems confined to administrative means 
rather than to policy ends. <20> The restructuring of the Scottish Health 
Service is a good illustration ofthis management style. It appears, too, as if 
the changes about to occur in the management of the NHS in Scotland may 
provide a further illustration. Before describing events in this area, and by 
way of concluding this subsection, a brief review of the current structural 
position in the Scottish Health Service is in order. 
By the middle of 1984, all health boards had their units of management 
in place; while doubtless scars remain the wounds caused by the 
reorganisation itself, and more especially by the way it was handled, have 
practically healed. Units present opportunities for improved management 
but they also open up the possibility of conflict within boards. In most 
boards some of the former districts have merely been relabelled units (e. g. 
Grampian and Tayside have done this in the case of two of the three former 
districts in each board). In devising units, services that were combined 
under the former districts have been divided. For example in Dundee with a 
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population of just under 200,000 three units have been created to replace 
the district: psychiatry, general hospitals, geriatrics and community 
services. This division of activities is probably no worse than any other 
(with the possible exception of organising services on a client group basis 
which may aid planning across services) but it could create difficulties in 
achieving co-ordinated care for groups like the elderly who straddle all 
three units. It means that professionals will in future have to deal with three 
sets of unit management groups, and four officers within each unit, instead 
of just one district management group as before. 
It is, of course, far too early to assess, or pass judgement upon, the new 
arrangements but there are grounds for concern that they may not achieve 
their aim of improved decision-making. Significantly, both circulars sought 
to impress upon health boards that the principle of the integration of 
hospital and community based services- a primary objective of the 1974 
reorganisation - be maintained. Proper co-ordination between units in 
respect of these services was to be ensured. The very fact that the 
government deemed it necessary to insert a statement to this effect suggests 
that it foresaw potential problems at this interface through the creation of 
units. As the Appendix shows, the boundaries of the old districts in some 
health board areas matched the corresponding local government districts. 
Some units (e.g. re-labelled districts) will continue to share these under the 
new arrangements. But in many cases, in part because units are not all 
based on geographical criteria, the mismatch in boundaries is now more 
apparent. For instance, the former South District of Grampian Health 
Board has been replaced by five units in contrast to two local government 
districts. In Dundee, where the health district and local government district 
shared common boundaries, there are now three units. Of course most 
local government community services are the responsibility of the regional 
tier the boundaries of which, with the exception of Strathclyde, are 
coterminous with health board boundaries. But housing is a district 
responsibility and social work divisions often match district boundaries. 
Since most contact between health and local authorities occurs between 
boards and regions the absence of common boundaries below this level is 
unlikely to make a great deal of practical difference. What it may do, 
however, is set back attempts to promote closer links at levels below health 
boards and local authority regions. 
Another issue is the extent to which units will be granted the 
devolution ostensibly sought by Ministers in terms of controlling budgets 
and decision-making. The issue of devolved decision-making was a key one 
in the former area/district structure, especially in the smaller boards, and it 
remains to be seen how prepared boards will be to stand back and allow 
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units to manage. This has become a major issue in England because the 
original philosophy of local discretion has undergone a quiet revolution. 
While vestiges of the old rhetoric remain in Ministerial speeches the 
catchwords are no longer 'flexibility' and 'local discretion' but 'efficiency' 
and 'accountability'. They signal a fundamental shift in the running of the 
NHS in England. An interventionist stance has been assumed by the central 
department which has replaced the former Jaissez-faire stance. The reasons 
for this shift cannot be considered here but have been set out by the author 
elsewhere. (ZI l Its implications for the new districts and units seems to be 
that regions are reluctant to allow districts too much freedom and, in tum, 
that districts are reluctant to let go of units. Span of control problems make 
it very difficult for regions to control districts and for districts to control 
units but it is precisely because of a concern over loss of control that regions 
and districts may be reluctant to devolve responsibility. However if units 
are not granted freedom to manage they will cease to be credible, 
authoritative bodies and run the risk of being bypassed in favour of districts 
in England and health boards in Scotland.<22l 
The volte face that took place in England is not apparent to such a 
degree in Scotland where initiatives to strengthen the centre's grip on the 
Service have not been replicated. Nevertheless it remains to be seen 
whether units of management will function as intended. Unless they do the 
case for reform will not have been met. 
Managerial Reform 
Not content with merely trying to get the structure right, the 
government has more recently directed its energies to the internal 
management of the NHS. Once again events in Scotland are inextricably 
bound up with events in England and, as with structural reform, have 
lagged some way behind. 
In February 1983, the Secretary of State for Social Services appointed 
Roy Griffiths, Chief Executive of Sainsbury's, to lead a small team with the 
remit 'to give advice on the effective use and management of manpower 
and related resources in the NHS'. The NHS Management Inquiry took 
about six months and a twenty-four page typescript, the Griffiths Report, 
was published in October 1983.<23> The Inquiry was confined to England 
although the team visited the central departments and health authorities in 
Scotland and Wales. In a Parliamentary statement, the Secretary of State 
for Scotland made it clear that he would be seeking to apply Griffiths to 
Scotland and that the first stage would involve publishing a discussion 
document. As mentioned already, the Minister claimed that one reaon for 
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finally instructing all boards to abolish districts was to pave the way for 
implementing Griffiths' proposals for strong unit management. After 
almost six months delay the discussion document<24l was published in June 
1984 with comments to be submitted by the end of September. The reasons 
for the delay are not known. One possibility is that the SHHD decided to 
wait upon events in England before making its move. Such caution 
probably reflected the DHSS's own reluctance to move too swiftly on 
Griffiths after an initial burst of enthusiasm on the part of the Secretary of 
State for Social Services. Once again, the SHHD took its 'lead' from the 
DHSS. 
Although confined to England, clearly what Griffiths has to say is of 
relevance across the UK especially if it is being acted upon beyond 
England. The report combines diagnosis with prescription. The thrust of its 
argument is that the NHS suffers from 'institutionalised stagnation', the 
result of a labyrinthine consultation process and a system of consensus 
management teams which gives the right of veto to each team member. 
Apart from the Secretary of State there is no manager, or managers, within 
the Service who can at the end of the day say 'the buck stops here'. There is 
a notable 'lack of a clearly-defined general management function 
throughout the NHS'. <25> Consequently in the Inquiry team's eyes 'the NHS 
is so structured as to resemble a "mobile": designed to move with any 
breath of air, but which in fact never changes its position and gives no clear 
indication of direction'. <26) Griffiths' observations are divided between the 
central department and the health authorities at region and district. He also 
comments on unit management. He does not mince his words when 
considering the role of the central department. There is 'a danger of over-
organisation' with the centre 'too much involved in too many of the wrong 
things and too little involved in some that really matter'. Authorities 'are 
being swamped with directives without being given direction'<27> which 
makes it difficult to implement major initiatives or achieve change. 
Not surprisingly Griffiths brought a business perspective to bear on the 
NHS and was intent upon emphasising the similarities between NHS 
management and business management, a view that is very much in 
keeping with the spirit of the times. But his diagnosis is broadly shared by 
many both inside and outside the Service even if differences of opinion exist 
over parts of it. For instance, consensus management has given rise to 
considerable comment and to sharp differences of opinion. Whereas 
Hunter<28> in a study of management practices in two Scottish health boards 
in the mid-1970s did not find any great enthusiasm for consensus 
management, Schulz and Harrison<29> in their survey of management teams 
in England found 'widespread support for the practice of consensus 
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decision-making'. But although Griffiths was firmly of the opinion that 
consensus management 'can lead to 'lowest common denominator 
decisions' and to long delays in the management process' he did not wish to 
replace consensus management in toto. Without detailing precisely what 
might be involved, a general manager was 'to harness the best of the 
consensus management approach and avoid the worst of the problems it 
can present'. (JO) 
The House of Commons Social Services Committee conducted a brief 
inquiry into the Griffiths Report and concluded that 'the general critique 
contained within the Report commands general assent'. <31 > But the 
Committee was less happy with some of the prescriptions to deal with the 
condition diagnosed. Four of the proposals merit comment. They are, first, 
to establish a Supervisory Board within the DHSS, chaired by the Secretary 
of State and charged with the oversight of the NHS; second, to set up an 
NHS Management Board under the direction of the Supervisory Board to 
'give leadership to the management of the NHS'<32) and to cover 'all existing 
NHS management responsibilities in DHSS';<33) third, to introduce a 
general manager at all levels- region, district and unit- to be drawn from 
any of the four disciplines currently represented on consensus management 
teams - administration, finance, medicine and nursing - and to be 
appointed from within each authority; and, fourth, to involve clinicians 
closely in management by, inter alia, developing management budgets. 
Rare in government, the Secretary of State for Social Services moved 
quickly on Griffiths particularly in respect of the reforms at the centre. If 
the issue of general management took longer to resolve than was at first 
thought desirable this was partly because of the need to consult opinion in 
the Service and because of strong opposition to the idea from powerful 
interests like the British Medical Association. Consequently conclusions on 
the Griffiths Report were not announced in England until early June. 
These were published in guidance to health authorities. <34> 
The government has opted for the appointment of general managers at 
all levels while allowing health authorities some flexibility over the precise 
details and timing of implementation. But they will not be able to deviate 
from the principle. General managers will for the most part be full-time. 
Combining the general management function with other duties is not 
thought to be desirable although it may be permitted at unit level to 
encourage clinicians tp apply for posts provided other duties take second 
place. In England, general managers, drawn from inside and possibly from 
outside the NHS, are to be introduced at regional and district health 
authority levels as soon as possible, and at hospital and unit level by the end 
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of 1985. Ministers are at pains to point out that there is 'no question of 
throwing consensus management out of the window. Consensus is vital to 
the management of any organisation . . . but this should not mean that 
decisions are ducked or avoided'. <35> General managers will be on fixed-
term contracts - 3-5 years in the first instance and annually thereafter. 
Further management training for clinicians is to be given a high priority. 
In a Parliamentary debate<36> on the Griffiths Report in early May 1984 
Norman Fowler, Secretary of State for Social Services, reported that the 
Supervisory Board had already been established. Under his chairmanship, 
it brings together key people both in and beyond the DHSS, including the 
Permanent Secretary, Chief Medical Officer, Chief Nursing Officer (an 
omission from the Griffiths Report, and Roy Griffiths himself. A 
Management Board is being established with a full-time Chairman 
recruited by open competition and acting as a fourth Permanent Secretary 
at the DHSS accountable for hospital and community services expenditure. 
Under its Chairman, the Board will be responsible for all the DHSS's work 
in relation to the management of the NHS- finance, personnel, service 
planning and so on. A personnel director is to be appointed to the 
Management Board. Pending the emergence of the Board, an NHS 
management group has been active in the Department 'to provide a better 
focus within the existing structure'. <37> To overcome fears that these new 
Boards might interfere with, or dilute, Ministers' accountability to 
Parliament, Norman Fowler has sought to assure MPs that the two Boards 
do not have separate corporate status and that their arrival does not herald 
increased involvement by the Department in the affairs of the Service. The 
Chairman of the Management Board, like the other Permanent 
Secretaries, will be directly accountable to the Secretary of State. He will 
not, as some would have wished, enjoy even the degree of independence 
and departmental detachment enjoyed by the chairmen of nationalised 
industries. 
In the Scottish consultative paper, the Secretary of State accepts the 
principles underlying the analysis in the Griffiths Report and believes they 
apply to the Scottish Health Service. He wishes to see the identification of 
general managers at both health board and unit levels. The timetable for 
the changes is considerably lengthier than the English one. It is divided into 
three phases: phase 1, the appointment of general managers at board level, 
to be completed before the end of 1985; phase 2, the examination of unit 
structures, management information and budgeting systems prior to the 
introduction of the general management function at unit level, to be 
completed by the end of 1986; and phase 3, the strengthening of the 
management function at unit level, with no time limit given. 
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The bulk of the Scottish consultative document is taken up with a 
detailed description of the functions of general managers at board level. It 
is considerably more thorough than the English circular which in any case, 
and as mentioned already, places much more emphasis upon the general 
management function at unit level. The Scottish document lists thirteen 
different responsibilities which would be part of the post. The Secretary of 
State also goes to great lengths to ensure that the general manager's 
overriding responsibility for the sound management of public monies 
allotted to the board should be clearly established. The Secretary of the 
SHHD, as Accounting Officer for the health vote, would delegate part of 
his authority to the general manager who would be required to appear 
before the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to answer questions on 
matters arising from the financial performance of his board. Indeed, the 
general manager would be directly accountable to the PAC since he would 
be required to sign the board's annual accounts. It is not clear if general 
managers in England are to shoulder similar responsibilities. Either way it 
seems curious that the Scottish document should go into such fine detail on 
this point. Whatever the reasons, the implications for the ability of units to 
operate freely are potentially profound. If the general manager at board 
level is faced with the prospect of appearing before the PAC, which has 
taken a tough and uncompromising line on variations in performance in the 
NHS, insisting on the need for tighter central control (see next section), it is 
hard to imagine unit general managers flourishing in such an environment. 
This could be one reason why the Secretary of State for Scotland is 
lukewarm about the general management function at unit level. 
In contrast to the plans for England, the introduction of general 
managers at unit level in Scotland seems less than clear. The vigorous 
policy being pursued south of the border has given way to a vaguer, 
more cautious and more relaxed approach. Although a general 
commitment to general managers at unit level is contained in the discussion 
document, 'at this stage the Secretary of State does not propose a specific 
timetable for the complete introduction of the general management 
function at this level' since he '... is not committed to this particular 
approach in every case. '(38) The document goes to great lengths to pacify 
the professions, particularly the medical profession: 'while the introduction 
of the general management function at unit level will affect the roles of 
individual professional managers, it is not (the) intention to weaken the 
existing involvement of professional staff in management. '<39> In England 
the importance of general managers at unit level as being vital to the 
success of the whole reform strategy is stressed in the circular. 'The 
primary objective for health authorities in implementing the (Griffiths) 
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Report's recommendations must therefore be to achieve changes at unit 
level and below. If there were no observable improvement in services at 
that level, in the eyes of patients and the community, within three to five 
years, then there would have been no point in making changes at DHA 
level or above'. (40) There appears to be a significant difference of emphasis 
on this point between Scotland and England although it is possible that the 
Scottish circular which will follow the discussion period will adopt a tougher 
approach. Another, albeit slight, difference in emphasis can be detected 
over the fixed terms for general managers. Appointments should be for five 
years and should be renewable which is in contrast to the English 
arrangements. 
At the centre in Scotland the changes being implemented (i.e. not 
open to discussion as happened in England some seven months or so 
earlier) are fairly limited and do not greatly disturb the status quo. A 
Supervisory Board has been set up with the Minister for Health and Social 
Work as the Chairman with a membership including the Secretary, the 
Chief Medical Officer and the Chief Nursing Officer of the SHHD, the 
Chairman of the Planning Council, individuals with relevant experience of 
private sector management, and the holder of a new post for NHS 
Management and Finance. No Management Board as such is being 
established but a new Under-Secretary post (Management and Finance) 
has been created and filled. The equivalent of the role which in England has 
been given to the chairman of the NHS Management Board (not yet 
appointed), the occupant of the post is in charge of a reorganised and 
strengthened group of divisions in SHHD concerned with NHS 
management, planning, finance and performance monitoring. This group 
was formerly the Planning Group (see Diagram). Unlike England, the 
Scottish equivalent of the Management Board is not being led by a chief 
executive, or general manager, appointed from outside the civil service. 
In sum, the changes proposed for Scotland are in line with the plans 
now being implemented in England. In keeping with previous 
reorganisations, there are subtle variations and shifts in emphasis reflecting 
different circumstances and interests. But the overall thrust of what is likely 
to happen is virtually the same. 
It is, therefore, almost certain that in Scotland the government 
will broadly follow England in the move to appoint general managers 
whatever the consultation process may reveal on the subject. It is hard 
to see how Scotland could for long remain out of step if general 
managers are to become the norm in the NHS in England. While fairly 
marginal variations in administrative arrangements are tolerated in 
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different parts of the UK/41 ) differences of this magnitude would be 
unlikely to exist for long. So it can be fairly safely assumed that general 
managers will be appointed in health boards and, over a longer period, in 
units. 
The general management function will have the most profound 
implications for health care management if it succeeds. It is a little ironic 
that Scotland waited upon events in England before issuing proposals 
because in fact the arguments in favour of chief executives for the NHS 
were originally ventilated in Scotland some eighteen years ago(42l and it is 
possible that the Griffiths team had the benefit of access to this work. The 
Farquharson-Lang Report was concerned with improving the 
administrative practice of hospital boards in Scotland and much of the 
managerial philosophy and quest for greater efficiency and effectiveness 
which emerged forcefully as central themes in 1974 can be found in this 
Report. It called for increased standards of management ability from 
officers and recommended the establishment of a chief executive post at 
each type of board to be filled either by a professional or medically qualified 
administrator, the determining factor in selection being ability and not 
professional qualifications. Like Griffiths, the Farquharson-Lang 
Committee had industrial organisations in mind when considering the 
relevance of a chief executive for the NHS. 'We see no fundamental 
difference in principle between the hospital service and other forms of 
organisation within which highly skilled experts exercise a considerable 
degree of independent judgement, subject to direction on broad policy 
determined by a board and interpreted for them through a general 
manager'. (43l For Farquharson-Lang the choice was a clear one which is 
echoed in the Griffiths Report. 'The advantages of a single channel of 
management and administration seem ... clearly to outweigh the possible 
disadvantages'. (44) Just as the Griffiths Report said much that was true also 
of Scotland, so Farquharson-Lang said much that applied to England and 
Wales. But in the mid-1960s the proposal for a chief executive 'was quickly 
seen to have fallen on fallow ground even in Scotland'. (4Sl Since then all 
official statements on the management of the NHS have consistently either 
rejected the case for a chief executive, as in England, or have avoided any 
mention of the subject, as in Scotland. 
The implications of Griffiths for the medical profession will be 
equally profound if they materialise. The intention is to make doctors 
more aware of the costs they incur every time they decide upon a 
course of treatment. Without actually confronting clinical freedom head 
on, Griffiths (and now the government) wants doctors to participate 
more closely in the preparation of management budgets. Some 
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commentators(46l do not think Griffiths makes sufficient inroads into 
clinical freedom and believe it will survive largely intact as a result. They 
see it as a 'fatal flaw' in the Report which will severely limit its impact upon 
practice. 
An Assessment 
As the title of this chapter attempts to convey, the NHS has been 
subjected to numerous organisational fixes since its inception. The rapidity 
with which these have been applied has increased since 1974 although 
England has borne the brunt of the battery of new initiatives. The pace of 
change has been considerably slower in Scotland and, indeed, many of the 
non-structural reforms that have taken root in England over the past few 
years, like privatisation and contracting out 'hotel' services, performance 
indicators, annual review meetings between Ministers and regional health 
authority chairmen and Rayner-type scrutinies of particular areas of 
administration, to name just a few, have not been reproduced in Scotland 
either in any guise or pursued with the same vigour. It is not clear why this 
should be so; there does not appear to have been a previous period in the 
NHS's history when there was such a marked divergence in policy style 
between Scotland and England despite a general tendency for Scotland to 
follow England's lead on major developments. 
While the major developments described earlier have been applied in 
both countries, the enthusiasm for them in the SHHD is far less evident 
than in the DHSS. Moreover whereas all the initiatives launched in 
England combine to form a reasonably coherent strategy with fairly clear 
philosophical underpinnings, developments in Scotland have been less 
obviously coherent or ideological. They have occurred more haphazardly 
and cannot really be seen as components of a blueprint or grand design. The 
George Younger/John Mackay ministerial team at the Scottish Office 
shows little of the reforming zest and zeal regularly displayed by Norman 
Fowler and Kenneth Clarke at the DHSS where scarcely a week passes 
without at least one major policy announcement, whether it be the 
activities of general practitioners, links between the public and private 
health care sectors, or whatever. This is not necessarily a desirable way of 
proceeding, especially if the pronouncements are contradictory, but it is of 
interest to note the rather different policy and managerial styles evident in 
the two countries. 
It remains to be seen whether all this hectic activity does more than 
merely heat up the system and offer a costly distraction from arguably more 
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launched in England have a more explicit and full-blooded ideological basis 
than the more faint-hearted approach evident in Scotland where notions of 
'paying lip service' and 'going through the motions' spring readily to mind. 
There may be other factors at work, however, which are less immediately 
obvious in England and practically invisible in Scotland. All the initiatives 
being pursued have as their common theme the drive for efficiency and 
improved control over resource use. If little or no new money is to be made 
available to the NHS, then the only alternative is to use existing resources 
more efficiently in order to create the means for new developments or 
simply to stand still. As Day and Klein<47) have said, it is 'the vision of a NHS 
that could stretch scarce resources by improving the quality of 
management'. 
The Treasury and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) are keeping a 
wary eye on health spending and unless the DHSS can be seen to be doing 
all it can to improve the husbandry of resources then they will draw the 
conclusion they have drawn before, i.e. that there is ioo much slack (and 
fat) in the Service, and act accordingly. It was the wrath of the PAC<48l in 
1981 which triggered the volte face on reorganisation in England 
mentioned earlier although this was not the only factor. A Green Paper<49l 
published by the Treasury in March 1984 states clearly that 'the Health 
Service needs to achieve continuing efficiency improvements, from higher 
productivity and better management, following the example of private 
industry in recent years'. Elsewhere the paper states that while demands for 
additional spending in some policy fields will be no more than special 
pleading there will be genuine demands for increased spending which must 
be financed by reductions in programmes of lower priority, or by further 
efficiency savings. The NHS is in the frontline of increasing demands 
because of an ageing population, increasing affluence and rising 
expectations, the switch from institutional to community care and medical 
advances. It seems that the Treasury's unswerving gaze upon the DHSS has 
deflected attention from the situation in Scotland although almost one-
third of expenditure within the Scottish Secretary's responsibility goes on 
health and personal social services. This, coupled with a healthier resource 
base and higher per capita spending on health, has probably sheltered 
Scotland from the full brunt of the cold winds blowing between the 
Treasury in Whitehall and the DHSS at the Elephant and Castle. Another 
factor disguising the situation may be the way in which the block grant for 
Scotland is assembled which may make it less easy for the Treasury to 
monitor closely what is happening within the individual spending 
programmes that go to make up the block grant. (SO) 
At a broader level, deeper environmental influences are at work. The 
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'Business Society' ethic is presently in vogue and manifestations of it in the 
health field are the Griffiths Report and numerous other initiatives 
designed to reinvigorate public sector management. The Business Society 
favours the private sector and self-Help and is suspicious of public sector 
activities. The NHS is caught up in a wider debate about the future of the 
welfare state and public provision. Although not immune from this debate, 
the Scottish Health Service seems less central to it than the Service in 
England. From a geopolitical perspective, distance may have its virtues and 
may have the effect of reducing the potency of the rhetoric that fills the 
Whitehaii/W estminster arena. 
Of the two sets of changes that have either taken or will be taking place 
in Scotland the Griffiths Report and its proposal for general managers is 
potentially the most significant development. It will only be so, however, if 
it impinges directly upon the process of management. If it is no more than a 
role change or a minor structural modification then the chances are that 
nothing of real substance will change. It has been argued that Griffiths 
'wants to change the culture. He is trying to do a very much bigger task than 
just appointing a general manager'. <51 ) If he succeeds then the way may be 
open to tackle some of the deep-seated and pervasive problems in the NHS 
which have remained resistant to the ministrations of successive 
governments. Among these is the oft-repeated aim of giving greater 
priority to certain client groups than they have received in the past and to 
shift the balance of care away from hospital, or institutional, care to 
community care. <52) It is here that another of Griffiths' proposals becomes 
crucial, namely, the involvement of clinicians in management. 
As has been mentioned, doctors' daily decisions commit resources and 
often the sums involved are not negligible. Whatever other changes take 
place, whether at unit level or above, will be rendered irrelevant unless the 
actual process of incurring expenditure at the sharp end of the Service is 
disturbed and modified. Doctors cannot be dictated to but they can be 
guided and required to justify explicitly their commitment of resources. At 
present they tend to make decisions in an implicit manner with no apparent 
consideration of alternative uses. Again, because ofthe historically healthy 
resource base in Scotland, including health care manpower, the pressures 
for improved clinical management are less acute. But they are there 
nevertheless and can be expected to intensify. A note of caution must be 
sounded. Just as structural or managerial reforms have been deemed 
panaceas for the ills of running a complex organisation so there is a danger 
of clinical budgeting and costing being included in the same category. 
Making doctors more cost-conscious and ultimately more efficient and 
cost-effective are laudable aims but while these approaches have merit in 
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some situations they can, if not handled with sensitivity, have major 
shortcomings. Care of the elderly is one area where the sensitive 
application of economic techniques is required otherwise one quickly 
reaches a position expressed vividly by Woody Allen: 'death is a great way 
to cut down on expenses'. (SJ) Economic and costing techniques have their 
uses but they do not provide the final 'single bullet' solutions to clinical 
priorities that some of their proponents envision. 
If Griffiths, and government initiatives based on his Report, can help 
alter the climate in which managers and doctors operate and raise 
consciousness then he will have succeeded in an area which has defeated 
many before him. And if management is about to take a new direction then 
what was advocated for Scotland in 1966 by Farquharson-Lang may finally 
be about to be put to the test. But if Griffiths does not succeed then the well-
worn cliche about the NHS being over-administered and under-managed 
will remain in 'good currency' as a valid judgement on the condition of 
health care management not only in Scotland but throughout the UK. At 
the same time the limits of administration should not be overlooked: 
perfect administration like perfect competition is an illusion. Misguidedly, 
general management could be regarded as the latest panacea to a range of 
deep-seated problems. Health care management is on trial. In the midst of 
all the activity could it be that this further round of reorganisation will be 
nothing less than yet another cruel diversion from the central policy issues 
confronting the NHS and health care? Although the lure of the 
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APPENDIX 
HEALTH BOARD DISTRICTS 
Board 
Argyll & Clyde 
(Population: 452.4)* 

















Local Government District 




North Ayrshire & Arran Cunninghame 
Kilmarnock & Loudoun 
South Ayrshire Cumnock & Doon Valley 

















Annandale & Eskdale 






Banff & Buchan 
Gordon 
City of Aberdeen 
Kincardine & Deeside 
Moray 
Greater Glasgow Western Part of City of Glasgow 






Part of City of Glasgow 
Part of City of Glasgow 
Strathkelvin 





















Local Government District 
Part of City of Glasgow 
Eastwood 
Part of City of Glasgow 
Caithness 
Sutherland 




Ross & Cromarty 
Skye & Lochalsh 
Monklands!Cumbernauld Cumbernauld 
Monklands 










Perth & Kinross 
(Single district) 
Motherwell 
Part of City of Edinburgh 
East Lothian 







Perth & Kinross 
(Single district) 
*Population figures at June 1981 (in thousands). 
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